Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 70

Issue 2

Article 10

1981

Kentucky Law Survey: Workers' Compensation
Norman E. Harned
Cole, Harned & Broderick

Richard Miles Hopgood
University of Kentucky

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons, and the Workers' Compensation Law
Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Harned, Norman E. and Hopgood, Richard Miles (1981) "Kentucky Law Survey: Workers' Compensation,"
Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 70: Iss. 2, Article 10.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol70/iss2/10

This Special Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information,
please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

Worker's Compensation
BY NORMAN

E. HARNED* AND RICHARD MILES HOPGOOD**
INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of the 1980-81 term of the Kentucky Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, most practitioners were trying to ascertain what impact 1980 legislative revisions' would
have on Kentucky's Worker's Compensation Act (the Act). None
of the decisions handed down during the 1980-81 term, however,
were decided under the newly revised Act. Nonetheless, many of
these decisions are still significant since they either were based on
statutes which were unchanged in the 1980 revision or involved
the application of common law principles.
This Survey examines some of the more important decisions
rendered by the Kentucky Supreme Court and Court of Appeals
during the 1980-81 term that addressed such issues as third party
actions, the statute of limitations, coverage under the Act and
penalties. The impact of the legislative revisions on these issues
will also be discussed.
I.

A.

THIRD PARTY ACTIONS

Distributionof Proceeds

In Hillman v. American Mutual LiabilityInsurance Co. ,2the
Kentucky Supreme Court was faced with the question of how to
distribute the proceeds of an employee's common law recovery
between the employee and the compensation carrier when the
recovery is less than the compensation paid by the subrogated
compensation carrier. Hillman was injured in an auto accident
while in the course of his employment and received compensa.tion benefits from American Mutual, his employer's compensa-

Partner in the firm of Cole, Harned & Broderick, Bowling Green, Kentucky.
LL.B. 1965, University of Kentucky.
J.D. 1982, University of Kentucky.
Act of Apr. 2, 1980, ch. 104, §§ 1-23, 1980 Ky. Acts 191, 191-205.

2 631 S.W.2d 848 (Ky. 1982).
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tion carrier. Hillman subsequently filed a common law civil action against the driver of the other vehicle and the driver's employer. American Mutual intervened in the action for the purpose of subrogating its compensation payments to the recovery
against the third party tort-feasor. 3 The civil suit was settled for
$25,000, which was the limit of the third party tort-feasor's in-

surance policy, and the proceeds were paid into the court subject
to distribution after hearing the claims of both parties.
Both Hillman and American Mutual argued that they were
entitled to the full $25,000. The trial court determined each item
of damage suffered by Hillman and American Mutual and then
apportioned the settlement figure between them according to the
ratio of each party's individual damages to the total damage figure. 4 On appeal, American Mutual argued that it had priority to
the $25,000 to the extent of the amount of compensation benefits
paid and payable to Hillman. 5 Hillman argued that he should
have priority because the compensation carrier's claim was deriv-

3 The right to intervene and subrogate is set forth in Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §
342.700(1) (Bobbs-Merriil 1977) [hereinafter cited as KRS], which states:
Whenever an injury for which compensation is payable under this
chapter has been sustained under circumstances creating in some other person than the employer a legal liability to pay damages, the injured employe
may either claim compensation or proceed at law by civil action against
such other person to recover damages, or proceed both against the employer
for compensation and such other person to recover damages, but he shall not
collect from both. If the injured employe elects to proceed at law by civil action against such other person to recover damages, he shall give due and
timely notice to the employer of the filing of such action. If compensation is
awarded under this chapter, the employer, his insurance carrier, the special
fund, and the uninsured employer's fund, or any of them, having paid the
compensation or having become liable therefor, may recover in his or its
own name or that of the injured employe from the other person in whom
legal liability for damage exists, not to exceed the indemnity paid and payable to the injured employe, less the employe's legal fees and expenses.
For a further discussion of intervention, see the text accompanying notes 13-23 infra.
4 The trial court found that Hillman suffered damages in the amount of $737,142,
or 88.6% of the total damages. American Mutual was found to have suffered $95,420 in
damages, or 11.4% of the total. The $25,000 actually recoverable was therefore apportioned according to those percentages. 631 S.W.2d at 849.
5 American Mutual's argument was based on KRS § 342.700(1) (1977), set out in
full in note 3 supra. The statute provides recovery for the employer or compensation insurer from "the other person in whom legal liability for damages exists, not to exceed the
indemnity paid and payable to the injured employe." American Mutual also asserted its
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ative in nature and the injury and damages "belonged" to him.
He further argued that apportionment was within the discretion
and equity power of the trial court. 6 The court of appeals, relying on Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 342.700(1) and language
7
found in State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Fireman'sFund,
held that American Mutual had priority over Hillman to the proceeds from the third party action to the full extent of any compensation paid and payable to Hillman. 8 Since the payments
made to Hillman exceeded the $25,000 recoverable from the tortfeasor, American Mutual was awarded the full amount.
The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed both lower courts
and divided the $25,000 recovery between the parties, but on a
different basis than that employed by the trial court.9 Where the
trial court had apportioned the damages according to the relative
amounts of damage incurred by each party, the high court
looked to the character of each item of damage to reach the
proper apportionment ratio. The Court held that KRS section
342.700(1) gives the compensation carrier priority only over
items of damage which are covered by workers' compensation,
stating that "[t]o the extent, however, that the recovery against
the torifeasor represents items of damage (e.g. pain and suffering) not covered by workers' compensation, the carrier has no
right against the recovery at all." ° Accordingly, the Supreme

priority based on the clause in KRS § 342.700(1) (1977), which prevents the employee
from making
a double recovery by collecting from both the employer and the tort-feasor.
6
This position is followed in some jurisdictions. See, e.g., Southern Farm Bureau
Casualty Ins. Co. v. Bennett, 131 So. 2d 499 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961). Florida provided
for equitable distribution by statute in FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.39(3) (West 1966); however,
the statute has been amended to allow the compensation carrier 100% recovery. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 440.39(3) (West 1981).

7550 S.W.2d 554 (Ky. 1977). In State Farm, the Kentucky Supreme Court held
that a compensation carrier had priority over an uninsured motorist insurance carrier's
claim to a judgment against the uninsured motorist. The Court stated that the compensation carrier must have priority because "otherwise the automobile policy would indeed interfere with the rights given to the compensation carrier under KRS section 342.066" (now
KRS section 342.700(1)). Id. at 557.
8 American Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. Hillman, No. 80-CA-1484-MR (Ky.
Ct. App. Feb. 13, 1981).
9 631 S.W.2d at 850.
10Id.at 850. The award for pain and suffering equalled $530,000 or 63.6% of the
total award. The remainder of the total award ($302,562 or 36.4 %) amounted to damages
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Court calculated the percentage of the total award attributable
to compensable and non-compensable injuries, respectively. The
Court then applied those percentages to the $25,000 actually recovered. The portion thereby characterized as compensable
damages (36.4%) was subject to subrogation by the insurance
carrier. The portion characterized as non-compensable (63.6%)
belonged to the insured.
Many jurisdictions have statutes which expressly establish a
priority between the employee and the compensation insurer."
However, the Court in Hillman was faced with a statute that did
not expressly establish a priority as to the distribution of proceeds
from a third party action, and, prior to the Kentucky Supreme
Court decision, the lower courts had no controlling case law to
follow. 12 The Hillman decision does not establish an absolute priority in either party, but, rather, gives at least partial protection
to both the compensation insurance carrier's subrogation interests and the injured party's distinct right to non-compensable elements of damage. Thus, neither party is entirely deprived of his
judgment because of the tort-feasor's inability to pay to the full
extent of his liabilities.

for lost earnings and lost earning power in one form or another, damages which are compensable through workers' compensation and therefore subject to the carriers" subrogation
rights.
11See 2A A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw § 74.31 (1976).
12 The Court noted that the issues presented in Hillman had been raised and left unanswered in two prior Kentucky decisions. 631 S.W.2d at 849. The Court in Stacy v.
Noble, 361 S.W.2d 285 (Ky. 1962) and Southern Quarries & Contracting Co. v. Hensley,
232 S.W.2d 999 (Ky. 1950) failed to decide if any proceeds for pain and suffering would
be out of the reach of the subrogated compensation carrier, since neither of the jury verdicts specified any sum for pain and suffering.
The Court in Hillman reaffirmed its refusal in Southern Quarriesand Stacy to apportion damages between the injured employee and the compensation carrier when the
trial court's verdict was general. The distinguishing characteristic in Hillman, however,
was the trial court's specific findings: lost wages, future earnings and pain and suffering.
631 S.W.2d at 849-50. These computations were atrived at by using the trial court's finding of damages to compute the ratio of $302,562 for those items covered by American Mutual's workers' compensation insurance such as wages, future earnings and medical expenses, as opposed to the $530,000 awarded for pain and suffering which are not covered
by workers' compensation and therefore not subject to subrogation.
Using the trial court's finding of damages, the Supreme Court held that Hillman
and the compensation carrier should "share the amount recoverable ($25,000) pro rata, as
between the portion of the judgment that is subject to subrogation.., and the portion
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Interventionby Compensation Carriers

3
In the unpublished decision of USF&G v. Firemen'sFund,
the Kentucky Court of Appeals put an end to informal efforts by
workers' compensation carriers to receive reimbursement from
recoveries obtained against third party tort-feasors. USF&G, the
compensation carrier, made benefit payments to an employee
who was injured in an automobile accident. The employee subsequently sued the other driver, who had automobile liability insurance with Fireman's Fund. Prior to the filing of the employee's suit, USF&G notified Fireman's Fund of its subrogation
claim. The employee's suit was settled without the intervention
of USF&G, but Fireman's Fund, "through mistake, inadvertence
and 'human error,' "14 did not protect USF&G's claim for subrogation.
USF&G sued Fireman's Fund and the employee, and subsequently tried to amend its complaint to include the tort-feasor.
The complaint alleged a right of indemnity against Fireman's
Fund and the tort-feasor and also averred that the employee
could not seek a double recovery. 5 The trial court refused to al-

that is not." Id. at 850. The court also implicitly rejected the court of appeals" reliance on
State Farm.
'3 No. 80-CA-2054-MR (Ky. Ct. App. May 22, 1981), discretionaryrev. granted, 81SC-583-D (Ky. Oct. 27, 1981), discretionaryrev. improvidently granted, 81-SC-583-DG
(Ky. Mar. 9, 1982). The Kentucky Court of Appeals reached a similar result to that found
in USF&G v. Firemen's Fund in the published decision of American States Ins. Co. v.
Audubon Country Club, 29 Ky. L. Summ. 6, at 8 (Ky. Ct. App. May 21, 1982). The court
there held that "a compensation carrier, under circumstances where the injured employee
seeks and obtains recovery from the third party, [does not] have a separate common law
action for indemnity against the third party" other than that provided in KRS 342.700. Id.
at 9.
14 No. 80-CA-2054-MR, slip op. at 2. Ky. R. Civ. P. 24.01 (Cum. Supp. 1980) [hereinafter cited as CR] provides for a right of intervention:
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an
action (a) when a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene, or (b)
when the applicant claims an interest relating to the propertyoi tiansactioh
which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of
the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect
that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by
existing parties.
USF&G had a right of intervention by virtue of both KRS 1 342.700(1) (1977), which is set
out in note 3 supra, and CR 24.01(1).
15 KRS § 342.700(1) (1977) prevents any employee from recovering from the compensation carrier and a third party for the same injuries.
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low USF&G to amend its complaint to include the tort-feasor
and dismissed the suit against Fireman's Fund and the employee.
The court of appeals, relying on dictum by former Justice
Scott Reed in Whittenberg Engineeringand Construction Co. v.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. ,16 held that USF&G had no separate cause of action for indemnification.17 In Whittenberg, Justice Reed stated:
In those instances where the third party is answerable to
the injured employee covered by our compensation act for his
negligence, it may well be that we will not allow parallel actions by the insurer in the form of intervention in the employee's suit under statutory subrogation and in addition an
action for the separate and independent cause of indemnity
by way of reimbursement for compensation payments
made ....18
The court of appeals decided that USF&G did not need a separate cause of action for indemnity since it had rights afforded by
KRS section 342.700(1) and Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure
(CR) 24.01(1) that were more than adequate to cover reimbursement for its compensation outlay.'1 The court justified its holding
on the grounds of finality and order. The court's concern with finality was well founded, since the statute of limitations for an indemnity action is five years.2° The court noted that to allow the
compensation carrier a cause of action for indemnity would
permit the carrier to "withhold intervention . . . breathing life
into a dead cause of action." 21 The court recognized the right of
16 390 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1965).
17No. 80-CA-2054-MR, slip op. at 5.
18 390 S.W.2d at 883.

19No. 80-CA-2054-MR, slip op. at 5.
20 KRS § 413.120(2) (1972) provides for a five year statute of limitations for "[an action upon a liability created by statute, when no other time is fixed by the statute creating
the liability." Under KRS § 342.700 (1977), the statute creating the liability, an employer
or insurer must either bring an action within one year after the employee's injury or intervene in the employee's action which was commenced within one year. See Roberts v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 273 S.W.2d 39 (Ky. 1954); Employer's Mut. Liab.
Ins. Co. v. Brown Wood Preserving Co., 182 S.W.2d 30 (Ky. 1944); Whitney v. Louisville
N. R., 177 S.W.2d 139 (Ky. 1944).
21 No. 80-CA-2054-MR, slip op. at 5. The court's concern for finality is well evidenced by the lapse of time in USF&G o. Fireman'sFund Ins. Co. The employee brought
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indemnity and its existence independent of the elements of statutory subrogation, but noted that "where the right of indemnity
action has been so zealously preserved, there was no other adequate remedy."2
The compensation carrier had an adequate remedy by which
to recover the benefits it had paid to the injured employee.
USF&G simply had to intervene in the employee's suit, as provided in KRS section 342.700(1) and CR 24.01, and receive reimhis suit on March 6, 1975 and USF&G brought the suit for indemnity on August 22, 1979.
' Id. at 3. For cases presenting situations where the compensation carrier would
have had no remedy for securing reimbursement for compensation benefits paid if a separate cause of action for indemnity were not available, see Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.v. Louisville & N. R.R., 455 S.W.2d 537 (Ky. 1970); Whittenberg Eng'g & Constr. Co. v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 390 S.W.2d 877; Union Carbide v. Sweco, 610 S.W.2d 932 (Ky. Ct. App.
1980).
In Whittenberg the injured employee had received compensation benefits from his
employer, who was the subcontractor for the general contractor Whittenberg. 390
S.W.2d at 879. The employee subsequently brought suit against Whittenberg, alleging
that Whittenberg's negligence was the cause of his injury. Liberty Mutual, the compensation carrier, intervened in the employee's action requesting subrogation for the benefits it
had paid. The employee's action was dismissed, along with Liberty Mutuals intervening
complaint, when Whittenberg asserted its nonliability as a statutory employer under KRS
S 342.055 (now KRS § 342.700 (1977)). 390 S.W.2d at 879. The compensation carrier was
allowed to maintain a separate suit for common law indemnity against Whittenberg. Id.
at 882. Without a separate cause of action for indemnity, the compensation carrier would
not have recovered the benefits it was forced to pay because of Whittenberg's negligence.
In Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Louisville & N. R.R. an employee was injured while
loading a box car for his employer. 455 S.W.2d at 538. The box car was owned by Fruit
Grower's Express and furnished by L. & N. The employee, who later died from his injuries, was paid compensation benefits by Liberty Mutual, his employer's compensation
carrier. The employee's personal representative later brought a wrongful death action
against Fruit Grower's Express and L. & N. in which Liberty Mutual intervened. Id. Under the wrongful death statutes that existed at that time, the plaintiff had to elect to sue for
pain and suffering and medical expenses or the destruction of the decedent's power to earn
money. The plaintiff elected to sue for the loss of the decedents power to earn money;
therefore, Liberty Mutual was unable to recover medical expenses since they were not an
element of damages in the plaintiff's wrongful death action. Id. at 538-39. The court of
appeals upheld Liberty Mutuals right to maintain an action for indemnity against L. &
N. for the medical expenses expended by Liberty Mutual. Id. at 540. Again, without a separate cause for action for indemnity the compensation carrier would have been without a
remedy.
See the text accompanying notes 24-36 infra for a discussion of Union Carbidev.
Sweco regarding the issue of indemnity.
See also 2A A. LARSON, supra note 10, at § 77.10 for additional examples and discussion of compensation carrier's suits against third parties for indemnity and, for a more
fully developed discussion of this issue, Larson, Workmen's CompensationEmployer's IndependentActions Against Third Party,27 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 223 (1970).
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bursement from the settlement proceeds paid by Fireman's
Fund. This decision may spur compensation carriers to intervene in employees' actions against a tort-feasor despite the risk of
losing their rights to indemnity.
C.

Right of Indemnity

In Union Carbide Corp. v. Sweco,2 the court of appeals reaffirmed the principle laid down in Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Jackson County Rural Electric Cooperative Corp.,2 which held that
the exclusive remedy provision of the Act does not prevent a third
party from maintaining a common law action for indemnity
against an employer.26
The facts in Sweco present the classic pattern for third party
action. An employee of Sweco was injured in a chemical explosion at Sweco's plant. After receiving compensation benefits, the
employee and the compensation carrier filed a tort action against
the distributor of the chemicals and Union Carbide, the manufacturer of the chemicals. Union Carbide impleaded Sweco,
seeking indemnification and alleging that Sweco was primarily
and actively negligent because it had failed to instruct the employee regarding safety procedures and neglected to provide the
employee with a safe work area. The circuit court granted
Sweco's motion for summary judgment based upon the argument
that Sweco was immune from suit under KRS section 342.690(1),
the exclusive remedy provision of the Act. 27
' USF&G's subrogation claim was for $1,636.35 and the employee's recovery from
Fireman's Fund was $7,500. Therefore, the funds recovered were more than adequate to
reimburse USF&G for its compensation outlay.
24 610 S.W.2d 932 (Ky. Ct. App.), discretionaryrev. denied, 613 S.W.2d 138 (Ky.
1981)w 438 S.W.2d
788 (Ky. 1968).
2 Id. at 791. See Larson, supranote 22.
27 610 S.W.2d at 934. KRS § 342.690(1) (Cum. Supp. 1980) provides:
If an employer secures payment of compensation as required by this
chapter, the liability of such employer under this chapter shall be exclusive
and in place of all other liability of such employer to the employe, his legal
representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from such employer at law or in
admiralty on account of such injury or death. For purposes of this section,
the term "employer" shall include a "contractor" covered by KRS 342.610,
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The court of appeals held that an action for indemnity
against an employer who has furnished compensation under the
Act may be maintained despite the exclusive remedy provision of
KRS section 342.690(1). This issue was first decided in Kentucky

Utilities v. Jackson County Rural Electric Cooperative Corp.;2
however, KRS section 342.690(1) had been amended in the time
between the Kentucky Utilities case and the Sweco decision. The
exclusive remedy statute in effect when Kentucky Utilities was
decided provided that when "both employer and employee have
elected to furnish or accept compensation under the provisions of
this chapter ... the employer shall be liable to provide and pay

compensation under the provisions of this chapter and
shall ... be released from all other liability." The current version of the exclusive remedy statute, KRS section 342.690(1), is
more strongly phrased than its predecessor, KRS section
342.015(1). The present provision states that the liability of the
employer "shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of
whether or not the subcontractor has in fact, secured the payment of compensation. The liability of an employer to another person who may be liable
for or who has paid damages on account of injury or death of an employe of
such employer arising out of and in the course of employment and caused by
a breach of any duty or obligation owed by such employer to such other
shall be limited to the amount of compensation and other benefits for which
such employer is liable under this chapter on account of such injury or
death, unless such other and the employer by written contract have agreed
to share liability in a different manner. The exemption from liability given
an employer by this section shall also extend to such employer's carrier and
to all employes, officers or directors of such employer or carrier, provided
the exemption from liability given an employe, officer or director or an employer or carrier shall not apply in any case where the injury or death is
proximately caused by the wilful and unprovoked physical aggression of
such employe, officer or director.
2 The basis for the decision in Kentucky Utilities
was that the common law right of
indemnity was well established before the adoption of the Kentucky Constitution and
jural rights established before the adoption of the Constitution are preserved by the Constitution; thus, the legislature may not abolish rights of action established before the adoption of the Kentucky Constitution. 438 S.W.2d at 790. See also Happy v. Erwin, 330
S.W.2d 412 (Ky. 1959) and Ludwig v. Johnson, 49 S.W.2d 347 (Ky. 1932). The Court
also relied on Ky. CONST. § 54 which provides that "[t]he General Assembly shall have no
power to limit the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to
person or property."
29 Act of Feb. 23, 1956, ch. 77, § 2, 1956 Ky. Acts 112, 113-14 (formerly codified as
KRS § 342.015(2)).
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such employer to the employe."33 The current statute also includes a provision limiting the indemnity liability of an employer.31
The court of appeals reaffirmed Kentucky Utilities and rejected Sweco's argument that it was no longer applicable because
KRS section 342.015(1) was superseded by the more strongly
worded KRS section 342.690(1).32 The court stated that "the
common-law right of indemnity is a jural right which existed
prior to the adoption of our Constitution and may not be abolished by the General Assembly," 33 reasoning that any subsequent
rewording of the statute would not abolish the common law right
of indemnity. The court interpreted KRS section 342.690(1),
which limits the amount of recovery against the employer, as
simply a limit on the liability of the indemnitor-employer and
not an attempt by the legislature to abolish the common law
right of indemnity. -4
It is important to note that the court of appeals left open the
possibility that any attempt to limit the right of indemnity may
violate the Kentucky Constitution since the only issue before it
was whether an action for indemnity could be maintained.3
Having decided that Union Carbide's complaint for indemnity
was proper, the case was remanded for the circuit court's determination of Sweco's negligence. 36
D. Notice to the Employer
In City of Louisville v. Burch,37 the court of appeals dealt
30 KRS § 342.690(1) (Cum. Supp. 1980). This section is set out in full in note 27
supra.
31 Id.
32 610 S.W.2d at 934.
33 Id. (quoting Kentucky Utilities v. Jackson County Rural Elec. Coop. Corp., 438
S.W.2d at 790).
34 Id. KRS § 342.690(1) (Cum. Supp. 1980) limits the employer's liability for third

party indemnities to the amount of compensation paid by the employer.
3 610 S.W.2d at 934. The court also refused to decide the constitutionality of the indemnity limit in KtS § 342.690(1) (Cum. Supp. 1980) because the Attorney General had
not been notified pursuant to CR 24.03 (Cum. Supp. 1980), which requires the court to
give notice to the Attorney General before deciding the constitutionality of any statute.
3 610 S.W.2d at 934. See Germain, Kentucky Law Survey-Remedies, 65 Ky. L.J.
285, 288-290 for an excellent discussion of the operation of indemnity in Kentucky.
37 611 S.W.2d 532 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
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with another form of litigation that evolves from workers' compensation claims. Burch concerned an employer's right to receive
reimbursement for compensation benefits paid to an employee,
when the employer did not receive notice of the employee's suit
against a third party tort-feasor.
Burch, a police officer, was injured in a motor vehicle accident while working for the city of Louisville. Burch received
compensation benefits which covered a portion of his lost wages
and medical payments. He subsequently filed a tort action
against the driver of the other vehicle, but he did not notify his
employer of the suit as required by KRS section 342.700(1).38 The
suit was settled immediately after the complaint was filed, with
Burch receiving the maximum bodily injury coverage under the
other driver's liability policy. Burch then filed a no-fault claim
with his insurance company and collected the balance of his lost
wages not paid under the city's workers' compensation fund. 9
The city then filed an indemnity action against Burch seeking reimbursement for the compensation benefits it had paid; however, the trial court granted Burch's motion to dismiss the complaint and the city appealed.
The court of appeals held that the city's right to recovery
against the other driver was affected by Burch's failure to give
notice to his employer as required in KRS section 342.700(1);
therefore, the city had a right to maintain an action' against
Burch to recoup the benefits paid to him. However, the court of
appeals characterized the city of Louisville's right of recovery as
a claim for money had and received by Burch.40 The court relied
on Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Snyder4' as a basis for upholding the complaint against Burch. Snyder held that a compensation carrier is entitled to maintain an action against an employee
38 See the text of KES § 342.700(1) (1977) at note 3, supra, for the statutory language
requiring notice to the employer.
39 611 S.W.2d at 533. Burch received compensation benefits of $1,104 for lost wages
and $4,093.50 for medical payments. The settlement with the third party tort-feasor was

for $10,668.98, which represented $10,000 for bodily injury and $668.98 for property
damage to his auto. The court of appeals recognized Burch's right to maintain an action
against the other driver since his medical expenses exceeded the $1,000 threshold requirement of KRS § 304.39-060(2)(b) (1981). Id.
40 Id. at 534.

4' 291 S.W.2d 14 (Ky. 1956).
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for money had and received, even if the employer has not received notice of the third party suit from the employee, but was
42
aware of the suit's existence.
The court's decision in Burch was consistent with the purpose
of KRS section 342.700(1), which is to prevent the employee
from achieving a double recovery and to give the employer an
opportunity to be reimbursed for the compensation funds. Yet
the court's reliance on Snyder as authority for this proposition
seems questionable in light of the recent decision in USF&G v.
Fireman'sFund Insurance Co.,43 in which the court of appeals
denied the compensation carrier the right to maintain a separate
action against the employee when the compensation carrier
failed to intervene in the employee's action. Nevertheless, in Snyder the compensation carrier was allowed a separate cause of action against the employee when the compensation carrier failed
to
intervene in the employee's suit. The facts of USF&G v. Fireman's
Fund Insurance Co. and Snyder are basically
indistinguishable and, in view of the court's recent holding in USF&G v.
Firemen's Fund Insurance Co. it is difficult to accept Shyder as
authority for the decision in Burch.44
4Id. atl6.
43 No. 80-CA-2054-MR. See the text accompanying notes 13-23 supra for a further

discussion of this case in the context of intervention.
44 In Snyder, the compensation carrier paid an injured employee compensation
benefits and, subsequently, the employee filed a claim with the Board of Claims, since she
was injured by the Kentucky Highway Department. Even though the compensation carrier had actual knowledge of the proceeding in the Board of Claims, it did not intervene in
that proceeding. Then more than one year after the employee received an award from the
Board of Claims, the compensation carrier filed suit against the employee for reimbursement of the compensation benefits it paid. The Court in Snyder not only upheld the compensation carrier's right to maintain a separate action for money had and received by the
employee, but also held that the compensation carrier was entitled to the five year statute
of limitations under KRS § 413.120(2) (1972) for filing suit against the employee. See note
20suprafor a discussion of KRS § 413.120(2) (1972).
In USF&G v. Fireman'sFund Ins. Co., decided in January, 1981, the court of appeals rejected arguments similar to those presented in Snyder and denied the compensation carrier a right of recovery against the employee. Snyder was not discussed in USF&G
v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. but the latter can only be read as a sub silento overruling of
Snyder. Note that a portion of the Snyder decision regarding attorney's fees in third party
actions was overruled in Charles Seligman Distrib. Co. v. Brown, 360 S.W.2d 509 (Ky.
1962), but the portion of the Snyder decision relied on in Burch was not overruled.
It is interesting to note that two judges of the court of appeals who participated in
the decision in USF&G v. Fireman'sFund Ins. Co. also decided Burch.
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Since Burch involved an employee's suit against a negligent

third party and the employee's no-fault insurer, the court of appeals referred to USF&G v. Smith45 as authority for requiring notice to the employer when the employee pursues a claim against
his no-fault insurer. Smith did present a situation involving an
employee's suit against his no-fault insurer and a third party tortfeasor, but the question of notice was not an issue in Smith since
the compensation carrier was also the no-fault insurer. The compensation carrier, therefore, would have been aware of the employee's subsequent claim for no-fault benefits. The real issue before the Smith Court was whether the collateral payments received by the insured employee should have been offset against
the no-fault insurer's liability for basic reparation benefits.4
The court of appeals' decision in Burch was consistent with
the clear requirement of KRS section 342.700(1) that the employer receive notice of any third party suits by the employee.
However, the court's decision would have been better reasoned if
it had treated Burch as a case of first impression calling for an interpretation of the notice requirement in KRS section 342.700(1),
rather than burdening its opinion with cases that did not resolve
the notice issue.

45 580 S.W.2d 216 (Ky. 1979) (cited in City of Louisville v. Burch, 611 S.W.2d at

533). 4 6

It seems questionable whether the compensation carrier should even be entitled to
notice of an employee's claim for no-fault benefits. An argument could be made that the
decision in State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fireman'sFund Am. Ins. Co., 550 S.W.2d 554,
holding that a compensation carrier was not entitled to subrogate an employee's recovery
under his uninsured motorist policy, is also applicable to an employee's recovery under his
no-fault policy. The basis for the decision in State Farm was that an employee's uninsured
motorist policy is a contractual relationship and the uninsured motorist insurer is not "the
other person in whom legal liability for damages exist" as provided in KRS § 342.700(1)
(1977). Id. at 557. The reasoning in State Farm would seem to be applicable to the nofault insurer, since no-fault is a contractual relationship and the no-fault insurer would
not be the other person in whom legal liability for damages exist. Under the foregoing
analysis the compensation carrier would have no need for notice of an employee's claim
against his no-fault insurer, because the compensation carrier would not be entitled to
subrogate no-fault benefits. See the text accompanying notes 8-11 supra for a more detailed discussion of State Farm. See also Home v. SuperiorLife Ins. Co., 123 S.E.2d 401
(Va. 1962) for an analysis of the treatment of uninsured motorist payments in workers'
compensation subrogation cases which the court in State Farm found "irresistible!' 550
S.W.2d at 557.
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STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Voluntary Compensation

In Hetteberg v. City of Newport,47 the Kentucky Supreme
Court held that voluntary payments of medical benefits are payments of compensation which toll the statute of limitations provi-

sions for compensation claims in KRS sections 342.185 and
342.270(1).48 Hetteberg suffered a fractured leg on February 26,
1973 while employed as a policeman for the city of Newport. At
an initial hearing before the Worker's Compensation Board (the
Board), the parties agreed that Hetteberg would receive tempo-

rary total disability income benefits through March 18, 1973.
The city continued to pay medical expenses incurred by him until August 12, 1975. Hetteberg filed a compensation claim on
April 12, 1977. The Board dismissed Hetteberg's claim, stating
that it was barred by the statute of limitations. The Board found
that Hetteberg should have made his claim within two years
after March 18, 1973, the date his temporary total disability payments terminated. The Board's decision was affirmed by the
47 616 S.W.2d 35 (Ky. 1981).
48
Id. at 36. KRS § 342.185 (1977), amended by Act of Apr. 2, 1980, ch. 104, § 8,
1980 Ky. Acts 191, 194 provided:
No proceeding under this chapter for compensation for an injury or
death shall be maintained unless a notice of the accident shall have been
given to the employer as soon as practicable after the happening thereof and
unless a claim for compensation with respect to such injury shall have been
made within two (2) years after the date of the accident, or in case of death,
within two (2) years after such death, whether or not a claim has been made
by the employe himself for compensation. Such notice and such claim may
be given or made by any person claiming to be entitled to compensation or
by someone in his behalf. If payments of compensation as such have been
made voluntarily the making of a claim within such period shall not be required, but shall become requisite within one (1) year following the suspension of such voluntary payments or within two (2) years of the date of the accident, whichever is later.
In addition, KRS § 342.270(1) (1977) provides:
If the parties fail to reach an agreement in regard to compensation under this chapter, either party may make written application to the board for
a hearing in regard to the matter at issue and for a ruling thereon. Such application must be filed within two (2) years after the accident, or, in case of
death, within two (2) years after such death, or within two (2) years after
the cessation of voluntary payments, if any have been made.
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Madison Circuit Court and the court of appeals, but was ultimately reversed by the Supreme Court.
Prior to Hetteberg, the appellate courts had continuously
held that payments for medical services did not constitute voluntary payments or compensation. 49 However, the Supreme Court
in Hetteberg held that the legislature intended to include medical benefits in the statutory definition of compensation enacted
in 1972. 0 The definition found in KRS section 342.620(14) reads:
"'Compensation' means all payments made under the provisions
of this chapter representing the sum of income benefits and medical and related benefits." 51 The word "compensation" is used in
both KRS sections 342.185 and 342.270(1), the Act's statute of
limitations provisions. The Court held that the enactment of
KRS section 342.620(14) was evidence of "legislative intent to expand what is meant by 'compensation."' 52 The Court noted that
the long line of cases holding that medical benefits were not compensation were decided before the 1972 change in KRS section
342.620 and therefore were inapplicable. The Court's decision
made Hetteberg's claim timely, since it was filed within two
years after the cessation of voluntary medical payments.5
49

See Emmert v. Jefferson County Bd. Educ., 479 S.W.2d 621 (Ky. 1972); Parrish
v. Briel Indus., Inc., 445 S.W.2d 119 (Ky. 1969); Pipes Chevrolet v. Bryant, 274 S.W.2d
663 (Ky. 1954). See 3 A. LARSON, supra note 10, at § 78.43(b) (1976). Professor Larson
notes that a majority of states interpret the term compensation to include payments of
medical benefits. The rationale for that interpretation is that the "furnishing of any kind
of benefit required by compensation law indicates an acceptance of liability." Id.
% 0 Act of Mar. 17,1972, ch. 78, § 2, 1972 Ky. Acts 305,306-09.
51 KRS § 342.620(14) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
52 616 S.W.2d at 36. The court did not discuss the city's argument that there was no
legislative intent to include compensation in the applicable statute of limitations provi-*
sions. The city's argument was based on the fact that the legislature re-enacted KES §
342.185 (Cum. Supp. 1980) and KBS § 342.270(1) (1977) at the same time KRS §
342.620(14) (Cum. Supp. 1980) was enacted. Therefore, when the legislature re-enacted
KRS § 342.185 (Cum. Supp. 1980) and KBS § 342.270(1) (1977) it could have made clear
any change it intended in the meaning of compensation as used in those statutes. Brief for
Respondent at 9, Hetteberg v. City of Newport, 616 S.W.2d 35.
53 Under KRS § 342.185 (Cum. Supp. 1980), it appears that the time for filing a
compensation claim is one year from the date voluntary compensation payments ceased. If
that statute had been followed, Hetteberg's claims would have been barred since he filed
for compensation approximately 16 months after his medical payments stopped. Thus, the
Supreme Court must have applied the two year statute of limitations under KRS §
342.270(1) (1977). The only statute mentioned in the court's opinion, however, was KBS §
342.185 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
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The Supreme Court's decision in Hetteberg seems fair in
view of the long period of time that Hetteberg received medical
benefits. However, following the reasoning of Hetteberg, any
employee who has a remote medical bill paid by his employer
could argue that the payment of that bill tolled the statute of limitations for his claim. The correctness of Hetteberg will have to
be evaluated based upon the results of future cases with facts less
appealing than those presented by Hetteberg.
B.

Notice in PneumoconiosisClaims

In Kirkwood v. John Darnell Coal Co., the Kentucky Supreme Court held that an employee is not apprised of the fact
that he has pneumoconiosis simply because he filed a federal
black lung claim and thus is not required to give notice of a work
impairing disability to his employer to avoid disqualification

The parties in Hettebergadmitted to the confusion that exists between the two statutes, but conceded that a two year statute of limitations applies to compensation claims in
Kentucky. Brief for Appellant at 5, Hetteberg v. City of Newport, 616 S.W.2d 35. There
are no recent cases discussing the differences between the two statutes, but several older
cases have confronted the problem in the context of Kentucky Statutes §§ 4914 and 4932
(1930) [hereinafter cited as KS], the predecessors to KRS § 342.185 (Cure. Supp. 1980)
and KRS § 342.270(1) (1977), respectively. See Davis v. Mitchell, 98 S.W.2d 474 (Ky.
1936); Scott Tobacco Co. v. Cooper, 81 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1934). The basic tenor of those
cases was that KS § 4914 (1930) applied to the time for making a demand to the employer
for compensaton and KS S 4932 (1930) applied to the time for making an application for
compensation to the Board if the parties could not agree on a compensation amount within the time set forth in KS § 4914 (1930). 98 S.W.2d at 476. It appears that the courts and
the practicing bar have continued to apply the interpretations of those early decisions to
the current statute of limitations provisions in the Act.
The legislature has further confused the application of KBS § 342.185 (Cum.
Supp. 1980) and KRS § 342.270(1) (1977) by amending KRS § 342.185 (Cum. Supp.
1980) to apply to the filing of "an application for an adjustment" of a claim instead of the
filing of "a claim." Act of Apr. 2, 1980, ch. 104, § 8, 1980 Ky. Acts 191, 194. That change
now makes KBS § 342.185 (Cure. Supp. 1980) and KBS § 342.270(1) (1977) apply to the
filing of an application for an adjustment of a claim. The problem with the 1980 amendment is that KRS § 342.185 (Cure. Supp. 1980) provides for a one year statute of limitations following the cessation of voluntary payments and KRS § 342.270(1) (1977) provides
for a two year statute of limitations following the cessation of voluntary payments. Practitioners should be aware of this shortening of the statute of limitations for the filing of an
application for an adjustment of a claim. See Basil, Kentucky Law Survey-Worker's
Compensation, 69 Ky. L.J. 687, 700-01 (1980-81) for a more in-depth discussion of the
amendment of KRS § 342.185 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
54 602 S.W.2d 170 (Ky. 1981).
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from future disability claims.5 The claimant, Kirkwood, stopped
working on July 2, 1973 due to a heart condition. He
subsequently filed a federal black lung claim in 1975. Kirkwood

was diagnosed as having pneumoconiosis in January 1976, and
during that month, gave his employer written notice of his disability. On March 5, 1976, Kirkwood filed a claim with the
Board. The Board awarded him total disability payments. The

court of appeals reversed the award, holding that Kirkwood had
not given his employer timely notice of his disability, as required

by KRS section 342.316(2) (a).
KRS section 342.316(2)(a) was first interpreted in Mary
Helen Coal Co. v. Chitwood57by the then Court of Appeals as requiring an employee to give his employer notice of disability
when: "(1) The employee has a disability from an occupational
disease which impairs his capacity to perform his work, and (2)
the employee knows or should know by exercise of reasonable

care and diligence that he is suffering from the disease."-' Under
this interpretation the employee is not required to give notice of a

disability until he has a work impairing disability from pneumoconiosis and he knows or should know that he has pneumoconiosis.
The Supreme Court in Kirkwood reasoned that under fed-

eral black lung statutes the actual presence of pneumoconiosis is
not required for the applicant to file a black lung claim "because
of the various presumptions contained in the statutes." 59 The
Court noted that many miners apply for federal black lung bene55 Id. at 171.
-1 Id. The relevant portion of KRS § 342.316(2)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1980) states:
[NIotice of claim shall be given to the employer as soon as practicable after
the employe first experiences a distinct manifestation of an occupational disease in the form of symptoms reasonably sufficient to apprise him that he has
contracted such disease, or a diagnosis of such disease is first communicated
to him, whichever shall first occur.
57 351 SW.2d 167 (Ky. 1961).
5 Id. at 168. See Peabody Coal Co. v. Guthrie, 351 S.W.2d 168 (Ky. 1961).
59 602 S.W.2d at 171. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-21 (1971). See also 20 C.F.R. §
410.414(b) (1) (1981) which provides in part: "Even though the existence of pneumoconiosis is not established. . . ,if other evidence demonstrates the existence of a totally disabling chronic respiratory or pulmonary impairment ... , it may be presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary ...that a miner is totally disabled due to pneumoconiOsi • •'s.
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fits simply because they think they are entitled to benefits as a result of long periods of mine employment or because their friends
and neighbors apply. 6 It is also possible that an employee's application for benefits may be denied. Based on this logic the Supreme Court held, as a matter of law, that the filing of a federal
black lung claim was not notice to the claimant that he was affected with the occupational disease of pneumoconiosis and
thereby relieved the claimant of any notice requirement under
KRS section 342.316(2) (a).61
The filing of a federal black lung claim may still be an evidentiary fact that the Board may consider in determining whether notice to the employer was timely.62 The Kirkwood decision
only holds that as a matter of law the filing of a federal black
lung claim does not apprise the employee that he is affected with
pneumoconiosis. The question of notice is still a factual determination to be made by the Board. 3
III.

A.

COVERAGE UNDER THE ACT

Determinationof ExtraterritorialCoverage

The court of appeals in Davis v. Wilsonl was given the opportunity to provide practitioners with needed interpretative
guidelines to the Act's extraterritorial provisions, KRS section
342.670.6 Wilson was hired by Clark, the sole proprietor of a
mobile car crushing business, in Pineville, Kentucky, where
Clark had a mobile home that he used as an office. Wilson's
duties consisted of picking up junk cars in a mobile car crusher
which he drove throughout Kentucky and Tennessee. Wilson

60 602 S.W.2d at 171.

61 Id.
62 See Yocom v. Harrison, 517 S.W.2d 231 (Ky. 1974). The Court in Yocom was

faced with a situation almost identical to Kirkwood, and upheld the Board's denial of
compensation, noting that "there was substantial evidence to support the finding of the
board that notice was not timely filed." Id. at 233. See also Caudill v. Jean Coal Co., 571
S.W.2d 633 (Ky. 1978) (citing Yocom with approval).
' 602 S.W.2d at 171. See Carol Coal Co. v. Harris, 477 S.W.2d 783 (Ky. 1972).
64 619 S.W.2d 709 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980), discretionaryrev. granted614 S.W.2d 538
(Ky.), discretionaryrev. improvidently granted620 S.W.2d 320 (Ky. 1981).
6 Act of Mar. 17, 1972, ch. 78, § 7, 1972 Ky. Acts 305,312-15.
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was employed for eleven weeks before being injured in Tennessee. During those eleven weeks, he worked two weeks in Kentucky and nine weeks in Tennessee. Wilson filed for compensation benefits in Kentucky and the Board found that he had sustained a compensable injury. However, the Board refused to
award Wilson benefits under the Act on the ground that he was
outside the extraterritorial coverage of the Act. The Bell Circuit
Court reversed the Board on the issue of extraterritorial coverage
6
and the Uninsured Employer's Fund appealed.
Wilson argued that he was entitled to extraterritorial coverage under either KRS section 342.670(1) (a) or (b) which provides
that an employee shall be entitled to benefits under the Act for an
injury suffered out of state, if at the time of injury: "(a) His employment is principally localized in this state, or (b) He is working under a contract of hire made in this state in employment not
principally localized in any state."' 7Since both provisions utilize
the term "principally localized," the court began its analysis with
the definition of the term as provided in KRS section
342.670(4)(d):
A person's employment is principally localized in this or
another state when:
1. his employer has a place of business in this or such other
state and he regularly works at or from such place of business,
or
2. if subparagraph 1 foregoing is not applicable, he is domiciled and spends a substantial part of his working8 time in the
service of his employer in this or such other state.6
The court assumed that Clark had a place of business in Kentucky and Tennessee, so in order for Wilson's employment to
have been principally localized in Kentucky he had to regularly

6 619 S.W.2d at 709-10. Clark carried no workers' compensation coverage and was
not a resident of Kentucky when Wilson's claim was heard by the Board. Clark did not defend the proceedings before either the Board or the circuit court; therefore Wilson sought
compensation benefits from the Uninsured Employer's Fund. The Uninsured Employer's
Fund exists by virtue of KtRS § 342.760 (Cum. Supp. 1980) and was created to protect employees from employers who fail to secure compensation. The Uninsured Employer's Fund
has standing to appeal. Davis v. Baker, 530 S.W.2d 370 (Ky. 1976).
67KRS § 342.670(1)(a)-(b) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
6 KES § 342.670(4)(d) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
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work from Clark's business in Kentucky. The court determined
that Wilson's employment did not indicate a steady or uniform
practice of working in either state; 69 therefore, Wilson's employment could not have been localized in Kentucky. Based on this
analysis, the court determined that subparagraph one was inapplicable and turned to subparagraph two. 70 The court found that
almost twenty percent of Wilson's working time was spent in
Kentucky and that amount of time was considered substantial
employment in this state. This finding of substantial employment
in Kentucky, coupled with the fact that Wilson was domiciled in
Kentucky, made Wilson's employment principally localized in
Kentucky under KRS section 342.670(4)(d)(2). Therefore, Wilson was entitled to extraterritorial coverage under KRS section
342.670(1)(a), since his employment was principally located in
Kentucky. 7' The decision in Davis thus leaves practitioners with

69 619 S.W.2d at 711. The court defined regular as "steady or uniform in course,
practice or occurrence; not subject to unexplained or irrational variation." Id. (quoting
BLAcKs LAW DICTIONARY 1450 (rev. 4th ed. 1968)).
70 619 S.W.2d at 711. It would seem to follow from the court's analysis that Wilson
should have been entitled to coverage under KRS § 342.670(1)(b) (Curn. Supp. 1980),
since Wilson was working under a contract of hire made in Kentucky and his employment
was not principally localized in any state. Apparently the court believed KRS §
342.670(1)(b) (Cure. Supp. 1980) would be applicable only if it could not ascertain a principal localization of employment under KRS § 342.670(4)(d)(1) or (2) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
Subparagraph 2 is prefaced with the instruction that "If subparagraph I foregoing is not
applicable .... " It seems arguable that Subparagraph 1 was applicable in determining
that Wilson's employment was not principally localized in any state and once that determination was made, he was entitled to coverage under KRS § 342.670(1)(b) (Cum. Supp.
1980).
The court assumed that Clark had a place of business in both Kentucky and Tennessee. The court also noted that the record was void of any evidence establishing the regularity of the presence of Clark's mobile car crusher in Kentucky or Tennessee. It is arguable that the court should have remanded the case to the Board for further factual determinations, rather than base its decision, in part, on facts not in evidence.
7' 619 S.W.2d at 711. The court of appeals also decided whether the circuit court
had jurisdiction to review the decision of the Board. Although it is unclear from the opinion, the Uninsured Employer's Fund apparently argued that the circuit court did not have
personal jurisdiction over Clark and, therefore, lacked jurisdiction to review the Board's
decision. The court dispensed with that argument by holding that "Clark's hiring and
working Wilson in Kentucky were transactions of business in Kentucky and were sufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts principals enunciated in InternationalShoe Co. v.
Washington." 619 S.W.2d at 710 (citations omitted). The Uninsured Employer's Fund relied on KRS § 342.285(1) (1977), which provides for appeals "to the circuit court that
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a guideline for applying the various provisions of KRS section
342.670 and provides judicial interpretation of key phrases within the statute.72
B.

Definitionof Employee

The court of appeals expanded the guidelines for determining employee status in Sears v. Oakwood Training Facility.73 In
this case, the court held that a part-time employee of a federally
funded program, administered by the Kentucky Department of
Human Resources (DHR), was an employee entitled to coverage
under the Act.
Sears, a 67-year-old widow, was working in a federally
funded program known as Foster Grandparents. The purpose of
the program is "to provide opportunities for low income persons
aged sixty or over to provide supportive person to person services
in health, education, welfare and related settings to children
having exceptional needs." 74 Sears was working in Somerset,
Kentucky, at the Oakwood Training Facility which was estab-

would have jurisdiction to try an action for damages for the injuries if this chapter did not
exist" for its jurisdictional argument. .Thecourt was correct in noting that this statute has
been construed as a venue provision for appeals in workers' compensation cases. 619
S.W.2d at 711. See Cabe v. Dudgeon, 404 S.W.2d 282 (Ky. 1966). However, this venue
provision is applicable only if the court which asserts venue also has personal jurisdiction
over the defendant.
See generally Rodwell v. Pro Football, Inc., 206 N.W.2d 773 (Mich. Ct. App.
1973) for an interesting case dealing with Michigan's long-arm statute and extraterritorial
coverage statute.
72 A comparison of Davis with United Pipeline v. Kaelin, 602 S.W.2d 176 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1980), the only other case that has dealt with KRS § 342.670 (Cum. Supp. 1980),
helps define the parameters of "substantial employment." United Pipeline held that the
employee was entitled to extraterritorial coverage under KBS § 342.670(1)(b) (Cum.
Supp. 1980) when he was domiciled in Kentucky and spent approximately 8% of his
working time in Kentucky. 602 S.W.2d at 177. In United Pipeline, the court must have
felt that 8 % of an employee's working time spent in one state was not substantial employment or it could have found that the employee was entitled to coverage under KRS §
342.670(1)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1980). Therefore, we know from reading Davis and United
Pipeline together that approximately 20% working time in one state will be substantial
employment and 8 % working time in one state will not be substantial employment.
73 623 S.W.2d 232 (Ky. App. 1980), discretionaryrev. granted, 613 S.W.2d 137
(Ky. 1981), discretionaryrev. improvidently granted,622 S.W.2d 217 (Ky. 1981).
74 42 U.S.C. § 5011(a) (1976).
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lished to train educable mentally retarded children. Her duties
consisted of working with two children for four hours per day,
five days per week for which she was paid $1.60 per hour, plus
lunch and $1 per day for transportation. She also received coverage under an accident insurance policy. An employee of DHR
was the acting director of the Foster Grandparents Program in
Kentucky.
Sears was injured when she slipped and fell after leaving a required meeting of the foster grandparents at the Oakwood Training Facility. She filed for compensation benefits and argued before the Board that she was an employee entitled to benefits under the Act. Her argument was based on KRS section 342.640(1)
which defines employees under the Act as "[e]very person ... in
the service of an employer under any contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied." She also relied on KRS section
342.640(3) which also defines employees entitled to coverage as
"[e]very person in the service of the state or of any political subdivision or agency thereof."
Oakwood Training Facility argued that Sears was exempted
from coverage because she was "performing services in return for
aid or sustenance only, received from any religious or charitable
organization," as provided in KRS section 342.650(3).7- The Oakwood Training Facility also argued that because there was no
mention of the Foster Grandparents Program in KRS section
342.640, the legislature did not intend for workers in that program to be within the scope of the statute. 76 Finally, Oakwood
Training argued that the money received by Sears was a stipend
rather than a wage. 7 The Board found for Oakwood Training

75 623 S.W.2d at 233 (quoting KRS § 342.650(3) (Cum. Supp. 1980)).
76 623 S.W.2d at 234. KRS § 342.640 (1977) is a rather all encompassing statute and
specifically mentions volunteers of several types of organizations as employees that are
covered under the Act.
77 623 S.W.2d at 234. See 45 C.F.R. § 1208.4-3(6) (1980), which was cited in Sears.
This section states generally that the stipend received is not treated as wages or compensation for purposes of taxes or other benefits received by the volunteers. See Camphill Vil-

lage, U.S.A. v. Workmen's Compensation Bd., 296 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1968). The court in
Camphill held that payments to a volunteer were subsistence that enabled the rendering of
services, and relying heavily on the characterization of the payments as subsistence denied
coverage. Id. at 133-34.
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Facility, stating that Sears was not an employee within the
meaning of KRS section 342.640.

The court of appeals, in holding that Sears was an employee
entitled to coverage under the Act, analyzed the case by using
factors that distinguish servants from independent contractors. 78
The court relied on Sam Home Motor & Implement Co. v.
Gregg,79 which set forth nine factors to consider in determining
an employer-employee relationship. 80 The court found that three
of those factors existed in Sears' employment: (1) Sears was required to work twenty hours per week at Oakwood; (2) she performed tasks in keeping with the goal of the facility; and (3) she

was paid an hourly rate.8' These factors were held to be sufficient
to establish an employer-employee relationship between Oakwood Training Facility and Sears, and thus entitled Sears to
coverage under KRS section 342.640(1). 82
In addition, the court reasoned that since the Foster Grandparent Program was administered by an employee of the DHR, a
78

623 S.W.2d at 234.

79 79 S.W.2d 755 (Ky. 1955).

80 Id. at 756-57. Those nine factors, as set out in RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 220(2)
(1933), are:
a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise
over the details of the work;
b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or
business;
c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the
work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist
without supervision;
d) the skill required in the particular operation;
e) whether the employer or the workmen supplies the instrumentalities,
tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work;
0 the length of time for which the person is employed;
g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer;
and
i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relationship of
master and servant.
81 623 S.W.2d at 234. These factors corresponded with factors (f), (h) and (g), respectively, as stated in the RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1933) note 80 supra. The
court did not discuss one of the most important factors, which is control over the person
hired. For a treatment of the control factor, see Turner Constr. Co. v. Garrett, 310
S.W.2d 786 (Ky. 1958); Redken Laboratories v. Wilson, 554 S.W.2d 874 (Ky. Ct. App.
1977),82rev'd on other grounds,562 S.W.2d 633 (Ky. 1978).
623 S.W.2d at 234.
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state agency, Sears was a person in the service of a state agency
and thus entitled to coverage under KRS section 342.640(3), as
well as KRS section 342.640(1).8 The court also rejected Oakwood Training's argument that Sears' coverage under an accident policy should have relieved it from coverage liability.14 The
court's analysis in Sears should provide practitioners guidance in
evaluating coverage questions outside the traditional business
setting.
IV.

PENALTIES

In Ernest Simpson Construction Co. v. Conn8 the Supreme
Court reversed the assessment of the 15% penalty provision of
KRS section 342.165s against a general contractor when the employee of a subcontractor was injured as a result of the general
contractor's violation of a safety regulation. Conn was the employee of Geneva Construction Company, a subcontractor for
Simpson Construction, the general contractor for the construction of a high school. He was killed when he fell from a stairway
constructed by Simpson Construction. The Board found that the
stairway was constructed in violation of regulations adopted by
the Kentucky Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(KOSHA) pursuant to KRS section 338.051(3). s7 Geneva Con83

Id.

84 Id. It is significant to note, however, that the Code of Federal Regulations states

that "[i]f
coverage is not required for Foster Grandparents under the state worker's compensation act, project sponsors shall provide accident insurance covering Foster Grandparents .... 45 C.F.R. S 1208.4-3(d)(2)(1) (1980). Apparently the sponsors of the Foster Grandparents Program thought they were not responsible for securing compensation
or they would not have provided Sears with an accident policy.
"s625 S.W.2d 850 (Ky. 1981).
86 KRS § 342.165 (1977)provides in part:
If an accident is caused in any degree by the intentional failure of the
employer to comply with any specific statute or lawful regulation made
thereunder, communicated to such employer and relative to installation or
"maintenance of safety appliances or methods, the compensation for which
the employer would otherwise have been liable under this chapter shall be
increased fifteen percent (15%) in amount of each payment.
87 KRS § 338.051(3) (Cum.Supp. 1980) provides: "The board shall adopt and promulgate occupational safety and health rules, regulations, standards, and secure all expertise, testimony, and evidence necessary to accomplish the purposes of this chapter." The
court of appeals' opinion did not state which regulation had been violated.
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struction paid compensation benefits to Conn's widow; however,
Simpson Construction was required by the Board to pay the 15 %
penalty and the circuit court affirmed.
The court of appeals' decision, which affirmed the Board's
rulings, turned on whether or not Simpson Construction, as a
general contractor who was not responsible for Conn's compensation payments, could have been considered an employer for
purposes of assessing the 15% penalty in KRS section 342.165.
The court of appeals held that Simpson Construction, as a general contractor, could be an employer for purposes of payment of
the 15 % penalty assessment, borrowing language from two other
sections of the Act to support its holding.8 9 The court reasoned
that under KRS section 342.690(1) the exclusive liability section
of the Act, the general contractor is an employer regardless of
whether or not the subcontractor has secured payment of compensation as provided in KRS section 342.610(1).10 The court of
appeals merely extended to KRS section 342.165 the general contractor's status as an employer under other sections of the Act. 9 '
The court further reasoned that the purpose of KRS section
342.165 is to enforce the safety practices of employers and it
would be unfair for an employer such as Geneva to be held responsible for the safety violations of other companies. 92
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the court of appeals
decision based on a strict interpretation of KRS section 342.165.
The Court held that for Simpson to have been liable for the
's No. 80-CA-737-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 1980), rev'd 625 S.W.2d 850 (Ky.
1981).89
No. 80-CA-737-MR, slip op. at 4.
90 RS § 342.690(1) (Cum. Supp. 1980) provides in part: "For purposes of this section, the term 'employer' shall include a 'contractor' covered by KRS 342.610, whether or
not the subcontractor has in fact, secured the payment of compensation."
KRS § 342.610(2) (1977) provides, in part:
A contractor who subcontracts all or any part of a contract and his carrier
shall be liable for the payment of compensation to the employes of the subcontractor unless the subcontractor primarily liable for the payment of such
compensation has secured the payment of compensation as provided for in
this chapter.
91 The court also took notice of the fact that Simpson Construction would have been
immune from suit by Conn as a third party tort-feasor because of its status as a statutory
employer. No. 80-CA-737-MR, slip op. at 4. This immunity would be a further justification for
assessing the penalty against Simpson Construction.
92
No. 80-CA-737-MR, slip op. at 4-5.
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penalty assessment, it not only had to be Conn's employer but
also the employer who was liable for compensation.9 The Court
found that Conn's employer was Geneva and that Geneva had
secured compensation insurance thereby relieving Simpson of
any liability for compensation benefits. The Court did recognize
that Simpson's action was the cause of Conn's death and that
there would be injustice in denying Conn's widow recovery under the penalty provision.1 Nonetheless, the Court stated that
the injustice created by the statute, as applied in the case sub
judice, would have to be eliminated by the legislature. 95
The Supreme Court did not discuss that portion of the court
of appeals' decision which rejected Simpson's argument that the
Board was without authority or expertise to rule on whether a
KOSHA violation had occurrede96The court of appeals had correctly cited Barmet of Kentucky, Inc. v. Sallee9l as authority for
the proposition that KRS section 338.021(2)98 does not prohibit
the assessment of a penalty under the Act for a violation of a regulation promulgated by KOSHA and apparently rejected Simpson Construction's argument on that basis." The issue that Simpson Construction raised, however, was not the Board's ability to
assess a penalty based on a violation previously determined by
KOSHA officials, but whether the Board itself had the authority
or expertise to determine if a KOSHA violation had occurred.

625 S.W.2d at 851.
1d.
95 Id.
" No. 80-CA-737-MR, slip op. at 6.
97 605 S.W.2d 29 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
98 KRS § 338.021(2) (1977) provides:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to supersede or in any manner affect any workmen's compensation law or to enlarge or diminish or affect in any manner the common-law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities
of employers or employes, under any law with respect to injuries, diseases,
or death of employes arising out of or in the course of employment.
99 KRS § 338.021(2) (1977) was interpreted in Childers v. Harvester Co., 569
S.W.2d 675 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) as precluding only those independent civil actions based
on violations of regulations established by the Kentucky Occupational Safety and Health
Administration [KOSHA]. The Childers' court further held that the statute did not prohibit the assessment of a penalty under the Act for a violation of a regulation promulgated
by KOSHA. Id. at 677. The court in Barmet reiterated the rule of Childers. 605 S.W.2d at
31.
13
94
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That issue was raised in Barmet, but the court there declined to
rule on it since the court had already reversed the penalty assessment on other grounds.1 0 The court of appeals in Conn erred if it
based its ruling regarding the KOSHA violation issue on Barmet
since Barmet did not determine the Board's power to assess whether a KOSHA violation had occurred.'10 The propriety of this
ruling is left open because of the Supreme Court's failure to deal
with this part of the court of appeals' decision.

100 605 S.W.2d at 33.
101See State ex tel. Whitman v. Industrial Comm'n, 3 N.E.2d 52 (Ohio 1936) where
the Ohio Supreme Court held that a compensation board had such power based on an express provision in the Ohio Constitution. See OHIo CONST. art. II, § 35.

